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Abstract. Numerous supposed immoral mandates and commands by God 
found in religious texts are introduced and discussed. Such passages are 
used to construct a  logical contradiction contention that is called the moral 
epistemological argument. It is shown how there is a contradiction in that God 
is omnibenevolent, God can instruct human beings, and God at times provides 
us with unethical orders and laws. Given the existence of the contradiction, it 
is argued that an omnibenevolent God does not exist. Finally, this contention is 
defended from several objections.
Since the first century CE, scholars have been well aware of the apparent 
immoral laws and mandates decreed by the Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
God in numerous religious texts and have attempted to reconcile the 
seeming discrepancy between the existence of a God who is wholly good 
and yet has promulgated such purportedly unethical laws and orders. 
Today, New Atheists use such discrepancies to contend that one should 
not look to the Torah, Bible, or Quran for moral guidance. However, 
things will be taken a little further in this paper and such discrepancies 
will be used to argue for an ontological thesis that God does not exist. 
While there are positive arguments for God’s existence such as the 
ontological, cosmological, and teleological arguments, a  new positive 
atheistic contention will be offered that is called the moral epistemological 
argument. It shall be contended that due to the supposed licentious 
beliefs and purported knowledge that God instructed to human beings 
through divine revelation, an omnibenevolent God really does not exist. 
First, the apparently immoral mandates contained within religious texts 
will be explored. Next, the moral epistemological argument will be given 
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and defended. While the moral epistemological argument may seem 
like a  simple and obvious potential argument against God’s existence, 
to the best of my knowledge, it has not been comprehensively and 
philosophically articulated before. Despite its simplicity, I  believe the 
moral epistemological argument is a strong argument for atheism, it can 
be properly defended, and it is worth fleshing out. In what follows, I offer 
its first comprehensive articulation.
No doubt the mandates of God that shortly will be discussed below are 
at face value considered to be atrocious and nefarious given contemporary 
moral standards. The supposed immoral aspects of the religious texts 
have motivated religious scholars for nearly two millennia to attempt 
to reconcile such passages with the notion of an omnibenevolent God. 
However, those with an atheistic bent have used such passages to argue 
that one should not at all times look to religious scripture for moral 
guidance. In other words, one need not necessarily determine how one 
ought to act in a given scenario by turning to religious revelations. For 
example, Bertrand Russell makes such a move in his essay ‘Why I Am 
Not a  Christian (1927)’. The philosopher Wes Morriston has written 
extensively and critically on the apparent immoral mandates of God. 
However, from such discussions, he does not draw an  ontological 
thesis that God does not exist. Rather, he merely concludes that such 
passages should not be taken seriously as moral mandates. For example, 
he states, ‘I have argued that the genocide texts should be rejected on 
moral grounds.’ (Morriston 2012: 14) He also concludes that it is highly 
unlikely that such commands were ever given (Morriston 2009). Other 
critical philosophers of God’s commands such as Louise Antony (2011) 
and Edwin Curley (2011) also do not draw ontological claims. For 
instance, Curley’s conclusion is only that such problematic passages are 
not the inspired word of God.
Modern day public intellectual atheists pretentiously known as the 
Brights or New Atheists have also made similar criticisms of religious 
texts. For example, Richard Dawkins writes:
The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character 
in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a  petty, unjust, unforgiving 
control -freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, 
homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalo-
maniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully. (2006, 31)
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Daniel Dennett notes that the Old Testament God is one who ‘could take 
sides in battles, and be both jealous and wrathful’ (2006: 206). Christopher 
Hitchens states that the Canaanites were ‘pitilessly driven out of their 
homes to make room for the ungrateful and mutinous children of Israel’ 
(2007: 99). Sam Harris comments that if the Bible is true, then people 
should be stoning others to death for heresy, adultery, homosexuality, 
worshiping graven images, and ‘other imaginary crimes’. In fact, putting 
to death idolaters in our midst reflects ‘God’s timeless wisdom’ (2006: 8).
New Atheists, as public intellectuals, have written exoteric rather 
than esoteric works, so they have not defended their claims against the 
use of religious texts as moral compasses from the numerous attempts 
by religious scholars and philosophers to reconcile the problematic 
passages in the literature. Moreover, their use of such passages is not to 
deny the existence of God. It is not to make an ontological metaphysical 
claim. Rather, such use of the literature is merely for the sake of showing 
that given God’s existence, his divine revelations bestowed upon human 
beings as presented in religious texts should not necessarily be followed. 
For instance, Dawkins states, ‘All I  am establishing is that modern 
morality, wherever else it comes from, does not come from the Bible.’ 
(2006: 246) Similarly, Harris writes, ‘The idea that the Bible is a perfect 
guide to morality is simply astounding, given the contents of the book.’ 
(2006: 8) This point that the New Atheists do not make an ontological 
claim concerning God’s existence regarding the problematic moral 
passages is not a criticism of them. For, their purposes in this context 
are explicitly stated as being non-ontological ones that merely argue 
that certain religious texts should not be read for moral guidance. 
Regarding their limited aims, they perhaps could have a strong support 
for their case if they additionally defended their premises from the 
numerous objections in the relevant literature from philosophers and 
religious scholars. However, what will be attempted here is the use 
of such problematic passages in order to make a  new argument for 
an ontological metaphysical claim that an omnibenevolent God does not 
exist. An atheistic positive contention called the moral epistemological 
argument will be offered.
The topic of this paper is an interdisciplinary one. On the one hand, 
I  address a  central issue in Philosophy of Religion and Metaphysics 
concerning God’s existence. However, as the examination of religious 
texts plays a  crucial role, religion scholarship also is important here. 
I believe that philosophers have only just begun to take the issue of God’s 
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supposed immoral commands seriously. As Michael Bergmann, Michael 
Murray, and Michael Rea note, ‘Despite the interdisciplinary character of 
the questions [regarding God’s supposed immoral mandates], however, 
philosophers have not been rushing to address the issue ... ’ (2011: 4) 
Most of the work has been done by religion scholars.
There are three main general new contributions to the literature from 
this paper. The first is that I take an old topic concerning the purported 
immoral mandates of God, and fully theoretically articulate how one 
may use this as an argument for atheism.1 The second contribution is 
that I  address and object to several attempts from religious scholars 
to reconcile the problematic passages, such as the moral relativism 
approach. Some of these attempted reconciliations generally have not 
been discussed by philosophers, and many philosophers may not even 
be aware of them. Third, at times I  provide novel counters against 
certain attempts to reconcile the problematic passages. To note, I  will 
also address attempts to reconcile the morally problematic passages from 
philosophers.
I. THE SUPPOSED IMMORAL GOD
Although there will be further qualifications later, the scope of the 
moral epistemological argument for atheism covers the monotheistic 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic God. The Jewish Torah, which is the first five 
books of the Christian Old Testament, and the Bible apparently contain 
numerous instances where God decrees immoral laws and mandates. 
While Islamists believe that the likes of Abraham, Isaac, and Jesus were 
prophets, they maintain it is the Quran that the angel Gabriel revealed to 
Muhammad that is the ultimate revelation of God. This text also contains 
apparent unethical commands.
For example, in the Old Testament and in the Quran, God allows for 
slavery and blood vengeance (Quran 61:92; 75:45). In the Old Testament, 
the law of retaliation in Exodus is ‘life must be paid for life, eye for eye, 
tooth for tooth. It is also hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, 
wound for wound and bruise for bruise’ (Exodus 21:23-24). The death 
1 It is unclear whether Evan Fales offers a  conclusion for atheism based on the 
problematic religious passages (2011). Regardless, even if he does, he does not articulate 
how the argument will go nor does he spell out the contradiction that is fundamental to 
the moral epistemological argument. As stated, to the best of my knowledge, I offer the 
first full articulation of this kind of argument for atheism.
125MORAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR ATHEISM
penalty may be given to those who strike their parents (Exodus 21:15, 
17), to homosexuals (Lev 20:13), adulterers (Lev 20:10), idolaters (Deut 
13:6-11), and blasphemers (Lev 24:14). For those that break God’s laws, 
it is said that ‘The Lord will give you madness, blindness and a confused 
mind. You will have to feel around in the daylight like a blind man. You 
will fail in everything you do. People will hurt you and steal from you 
every day. There will be no one to save you’ (Deut 28:28-29).
In the Old Testament, there also are numerous passages where 
women do not fare well in light of the decrees of God. Women who were 
found not to be virgins on their wedding night must be stoned to death 
(Deut 22:13-21). Prostitution by a priest’s daughter mandated death by 
fire (Lev 21:9). In the Quran, women also do not fare well. God directs 
the inheritance of male children to be twice that of females (4:11). 
God orders for the beating of obstinately disobedient wives after one’s 
attempts at admonishing and refusing to sleep in the same bed with 
them have failed (4:34). Moreover, God provides young female virgins 
for sexual gratification to those men who reach paradise (55:56; 56:35-
38; 78:31-33).
While this discussion of supposedly appalling laws and orders given 
by God may continue for quite some time and are renounced by most 
modern day theists, God’s mandates for war in the Old Testament must 
also be discussed. God orders Saul to kill all of the Amalekites, women 
and children. ‘Now go, attack the Amalekites. Destroy everything that 
belongs to them as an offering to the Lord. Don’t let anything live. Put 
to death men and women, children and small babies. Kill the cattle 
and sheep, camels and donkeys.’ (1 Sam 15:3) God commands Joshua 
on a  wholesale and indiscriminate level to attack, kill, and destroy 
numerous cities and peoples such as in Libnah, Lachish, Eglon, Hebron, 
Debir, Hazor, and Canaan (Josh 10:40). As God says, ‘you must not let 
anything that breathes remain alive’ (Deut 20:16). God commands Moses 
in regards to Midian, ‘Kill all the Midianite boys. Kill all the Midianite 
women who have had sexual relations. But save the girls for yourselves 
who have not had sexual relations with a  man’ (Num 31:17-18). The 
following passage promotes slavery, rape, and genocide:
When you draw near to a  town to fight against it, offer it terms of 
peace. If it accepts your terms of peace and surrenders to you, then all 
the people in it shall serve you as forced labour. If it does not submit to 
you peacefully, but makes war against you, then you shall besiege it; and 
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when the Lord your God gives it into your hand, you shall put all its 
males to the sword. You may, however, take as your booty the women, 
the children, livestock, and everything else in the town, all its spoil. You 
may enjoy the spoil of your enemies, which the Lord your God has given 
you. Thus you shall treat all the towns that are very far from you, which 
are not towns of the nations here. (Deut 20: 10-18)
To note, while philosophers such as Paul Copan have pointed out 
such facts as that the Israelites in practice did not actually completely 
annihilate the population of Canaanites (2011), the main point for the 
aims of this paper is that as James Barr states, ‘the problem is not whether 
the narratives are fact or fiction; the problem is that, whether fact or 
fiction, the ritual destruction is commended’ (1993: 209). The fact that 
God orders and commends such ethnic cleansing and other immoral acts 
to occur is what is important for the moral epistemological argument.
Also, notice that in the New Testament, there are also many supposed 
immoral mandates. Jesus states, ‘Don’t misunderstand why I have come. 
I did not come to abolish the law of Moses or the writings of the prophets. 
No, I came to accomplish their purpose.’ (Matthew 5:17) Jesus says that 
he supports the moral laws of the Old Testament. Furthermore, in the 
New Testament in the Book of Revelations, after God purposefully wipes 
out a sizable portion of the human population by causing extreme natural 
disasters and plagues in which people beg for death due to their suffering 
but God does not let them die for five months, God commands the four 
angels of the Euphrates River and 200 million horsemen to kill another 
third of all humankind (Rev 9:13-15).2 If this were to happen today, well 
over 2 billion people will be killed from the horsemen. All in all, we see 
that there are numerous apparent immoral mandates contained in the 
Quran and in the Old & New Testaments.
II. THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Like the logical problem of evil, the moral epistemological argument 
is a logical contradiction problem for theism.3 There is a contradiction 
2 While some who will be killed are murderers, and thus, if capital punishment is 
justified, they deserve to be killed by the horsemen, others will be killed because they 
have different faiths or because they are thieves. A truly omnibenevolent God would not 
order the capital punishment of people due to the fact that they do not believe in him 
or that they are thieves.
3 Only the logical rather than the evidential problem of evil is mentioned here.
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in the fact that God is omnibenevolent, God has the power to provide 
knowledge of good and evil to human beings, and God at times gives 
immoral laws to people. To fully spell out the contradiction, God’s 
omnibenevolence means that he has full knowledge of what is objectively 
right and wrong and that when God provides humans with laws and 
commands, they always should be moral rather than immoral ones.4 
Given that God has full knowledge of what is objectively right and wrong 
and that he has the power to perform divine revelation, when he does 
provide humans with moral precepts and orders, they must be moral 
rather than immoral. However, God apparently does not always provide 
human beings with beliefs of objectively virtuous laws and commands. 
At times God seemingly gives people maxims of utter depravity and 
wickedness. The contradiction lies in the fact that some of the purported 
moral knowledge that is given to humans by divine revelation is at times 
ethically and objectively wrong. Therefore, the existence of God and the 
existence of the supposed immoral mandates are incompatible with each 
other, where given the immoral mandates, we may conclude that the 
omnibenevolent God really does not exist.5 Notice that in order to form 
the contradiction, one merely needs only one immoral command from 
God.
It may be understood that most theists will agree with the 
characteristics of God that are required in the moral epistemological 
argument. Most theists will think it is an uncontroversial fact that God is 
omnibenevolent such that God has full knowledge of what is objectively 
right and wrong and that he should not provide human beings with 
immoral laws. In addition to omnibenevolence, he also has the power to 
bestow moral laws upon humans through divine revelation. Of course, 
one may always in some way deny one of these attributes, which will 
allow one to escape the moral epistemological argument, and in this 
sense, the moral epistemological argument is limited. For instance, if one 
4 The attribute of having full knowledge of right and wrong is listed under the category 
of omnibenevolence rather than under some specified knowledge attribute of God since 
a wholly good being should have full knowledge of right and wrong. Whether having 
full knowledge of right and wrong should be categorized under omnibenevolence or 
under some qualified knowledge characteristic of God such as omniscience matters not 
for the aims of this paper.
5 Notice that the conclusion that an omnibenevolent God does not exist leaves open 
the possibility that an evil God exists, just as the problem of evil and the problem of 
hell do.
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believes that God is not omnibenevolent as defined here, then this may 
be perfectly consistent with the fact that God can provide humans with 
immoral commands. If God cannot communicate with humans, then 
despite God’s omnibenevolence, he lacks the capacity to instruct people 
in ethics. Thus, God does not really provide people with commands on 
how we ought to live our lives, whether they be moral or not. However, 
I take it that most theists do maintain that God is omnibenevolent in the 
sense that he has full knowledge of what is objectively right and wrong 
and that when he gives humans moral commands, he should give morally 
praiseworthy knowledge. Moreover, most theists will agree that God can 
communicate with human beings. Therefore, the moral epistemological 
argument may be taken to be a contention of significant scope.
Notice also that the moral epistemological argument is not to be 
confused with the problem of evil, even though both arguments deal 
in some way with right and wrong. On one variant, the problem of evil 
can also be thought of as a logical contradiction argument against God’s 
existence. It states that there is a contradiction in the fact that God is 
omnibenevolent, where God attempts to eliminate evil as far as possible, 
God is omnipotent, and evil exists. Given the supposed contradiction 
and the existence of evil, the omnibenevolent God does not exist. First, 
regarding the crucial attributes of God in the two arguments, the moral 
epistemological argument, in order to formulate the contradiction, 
primarily requires God’s omnibenevolence to mean that God has full 
knowledge of what is objectively right and wrong and that he should 
provide people with moral commands whenever he tells people how they 
should live their lives. While this understanding of omnibenevolence 
is perfectly consistent with attaching further attributes to the meaning 
of the concept, for the problem of evil, the primary focus on God’s 
omnibenevolence in order to construct the relevant contradiction is 
different in that it is mainly used to argue that God is to eliminate the 
presence of evil as far as possible. Also, the problem of evil requires 
a  significant degree of power for God in order to have the power to 
eliminate evil as far as possible. Thus, it is said in the problem of evil that 
God is omnipotent, although there may be certain restrictions to his 
omnipotence such as not being able to do what is logically impossible. 
However, for the moral epistemological argument, the measure of power 
required of God in order to sufficiently make the relevant case is that 
God has the power to communicate with human beings through divine 
revelation. It is a much weaker requirement of power for God. Second, 
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concerning the non-attributes of God, the problem of evil states that 
evil exists whereas the moral epistemological argument claims that the 
purported knowledge that God gives human beings of ethics is immoral 
and is not really moral knowledge at all. These are two different things, 
where the former is about natural evil and immoral actions performed 
between human beings that happen in the world, and the latter is about 
divine revelation and the supposed moral knowledge that God gives 
human beings. Notice that one celebrated counter to the problem of 
evil in order to account for human evil is the free will defence. God 
creates a greater state of affairs by providing people with the freedom 
to perform good or evil against each other. If this is the case, then the 
contradiction formulated by the problem of evil regarding the existence 
of human evil potentially disappears. However, notice for the moral 
epistemological argument that even if it is granted that human beings 
can make free choices, the contradiction in the moral epistemological 
argument still remains.
Also, the moral epistemological argument can be distinguished from 
the problem of hell, which is also a  logical contradiction argument 
concluding that God does not exist. The problem of hell generally states 
that there is a contradiction in God being omnibenevolent, omniscient, 
and omnipotent and hell existing, where people are consigned to hell 
forever for eternal punishment (Adams 1993). Such a hell with its infinite 
punishment is evil, and given God’s attributes, God should not have 
allowed for such a hell to exist. Given the supposed contradiction, we 
may then conclude that an omnibenevolent God does not exist. Notice 
the problem of hell states that an evil hell and location exists whereas the 
moral epistemological argument claims that the purported knowledge 
that God gives human beings of ethics is immoral and is not really moral 
knowledge at all. There are potential responses to the problem of hell, 
such as the universalist reply that hell is only for temporary rather than 
permanent residence or that there is no suffering in hell. Those who 
espouse the choice model response contend that hell is not for retributive 
purposes. Rather, it is for those who freely choose to be apart from God. 
They may be with God in heaven if they so choose, but they choose 
otherwise. Notice that even if such potential responses to the problem of 
hell are true, such responses by themselves will not sufficiently be able to 
respond to the moral epistemological argument given all the supposed 
immoral commands in scripture. The contradiction found in the moral 
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epistemological argument and in many of God’s ethical commands still 
exists.
As previously stated, while I take it that most theists will understand 
the attributes of God as listed in the moral epistemological argument to 
be uncontroversial, such theists may counter that God does not really 
provide human beings with immoral commands and laws or that such 
orders can somehow be reconciled with an omnibenevolent God. It is 
this crucial premise regarding God’s omnibenevolence in the moral 
epistemological argument that will now be defended.
III. THE MORAL EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT DEFENDED
To note, most sophisticated scholarly work in reconciling problematic 
immoral passages in religious texts primarily comes from Christian 
philosophers and scholars, so the potential objections that will be 
addressed here will come from the Christian perspective, and mention 
of the Old and New Testament rather than the Quran will be used 
throughout. While it may be contentious whether Islamists and Jewish 
believers may make the below evolutionary argument, it may be 
understood that they may make all subsequently entertained objections, 
mutatis mutandis, and that similar responses to such objections as the 
ones provided in this paper may also be given to them mutatis mutandis.
The first important objection that will be examined is the evolutionary 
or developmental approach primarily championed by Julius Wellhausen 
but also espoused by others such as Peter van Inwagen (Wellhausen 
1885, Arnold 1884, Maurice 1855, Albright 1940, van Inwagen 2011). 
In respect to the Hebrew Bible, the evolutionary account claims that 
there is a gradual and progressive development in moral perception for 
the Israelites. Analogous to the moral development of a child that goes 
through several stages of development into adulthood, God was a skilful 
teacher advancing the Israelites to higher moral levels only to the extent 
that they would be able and ready to receive such moral wisdom given 
a  certain period in their moral development. At various stages, God 
taught only at the level that the Israelites could comprehend a  moral 
lesson at a given time, but gradually God’s moral lessons progressed in 
wisdom until it reached its pinnacle in the teachings contained in the 
New Testament. Therefore, there is no perceived inconsistency since 
the problematic passages in the Bible may be reconciled based on 
an evolutionary account.
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First, there are highly questionable moral passages in the New 
Testament as well such as in the Book of Revelations, where it is 
commended that scores of those who do not worship the one true God 
but who have different faiths are killed by God (Revelations 9:13-21). 
Furthermore, recall that Jesus himself states his adherence to the laws 
of the Old Testament. It does not appear that God’s moral teachings are 
evolving. Second, even if the Old Testament can be viewed as an early 
stage of moral development, the stated permissibility of revenge killings, 
rape, slavery, and genocide should never be given by an omnibenevolent 
God no matter how crude a  level of moral development the Israelites 
were at. Just as one should never tell an unruly child that hitting other 
children is permissible, one should not tell a young group of Israelites 
that rape and genocide is permissible. For, imagine that a  parent tells 
a  child who is prone to disobedience that it is permissible to strike 
others including newborn infants, only to instruct him in his teenage 
years that such acts are morally wrong. Is this an  instance of skilful 
moral direction or a highly questionable cultivation of the ethical? This 
is clearly an instance of morally wrong instruction, and this conclusion 
analogously would also hold for the case of God. If the evolutionary 
account is true, God deserves our righteous indignation for such 
a reprehensible method of moral teaching. In light of the evolutionary 
account, the problematic moral commands from God still strikes one as 
being very morally wrong. To note, while the theist may now claim that 
God works in mysterious ways, such a move will be addressed at the end 
of this essay.
Another potential objection is that of cultural moral relativism. 
Dennis Nineham and Cyril Rodd have generally argued that those in 
the Old Testament lived in an  agrarian, slave-based, patriarchic, and 
polygamous society vastly different from our own, including in terms 
of morality (Nineham 1976, Rodd 2001). Now, on the cultural moral 
relativism view, adherents argue that what is morally true and false is 
relative to cultures. There is no absolute or universal moral truth at all. 
There is no independent objective perspective at all from which people 
or God may judge other cultures’ moral systems. Rather the moral 
system of the Old Testament is true relative to the early Israelites, and 
the moral beliefs of current theists are true relative to their modern 
culture. Making this cultural relativist move is further beneficial in 
that this means modern day theists do not have to abide by the cultural 
laws of the Old Testament. Now, those who espouse a  cultural moral 
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relativist position may attempt to escape the contradiction in the moral 
epistemological argument by claiming that the apparently problematic 
passages in religious texts are not problematic relative to the Old 
Testament moral culture. As the moral epistemological argument states 
that the given problematic passages are universally wrong, those theists 
who take the cultural relativist route may object to this premise.
While this is an  interesting move in order to reconcile certain 
apparently problematic passages of the Old Testament, contemporary 
theists who make such a move may potentially only do so by failing to 
see the wider implications of cultural moral relativism. If moral truth 
is relative to cultures, then today’s theist cannot properly criticize the 
ethical values of, for instance, Nazi Germany or the practices of slavery 
in the Antebellum American South. They cannot claim that the attempt 
of the extermination of the Jewish population in World War II Germany 
and slavery in the American South was wrong from an objective point of 
view. They cannot even claim that God would say that the Nazi Germans 
and slavery are objectively wrong. At most, they and God may claim 
that such atrocities are wrong relative to their own or a certain culture 
in a particular period of time, but they are morally correct relative to 
the perpetrator’s culture. However, most modern day theists claim that 
such acts are objectively morally wrong and that God would say so as 
well. When pressed appropriately and shown what logically follows 
from cultural relativism, I take it that most theists will not espouse this 
strategy. Based on empirical evidence, theists commonly believe in 
an objective morality, not a relativistic one (Goodwin and Darley 2008). 
When Jesus says to treat others as you yourself would like to be treated, 
most Christians believe this to be a  universal moral command that is 
true even for cultures with moral systems that are incompatible with 
this law for certain situations. When Jesus gave his moral teachings, at 
the time they were meant for the Jewish people and the early Christians 
as well as for the Ancient Romans, even though the Romans may be 
thought to have had a different moral culture. When so pressed, theists 
generally will understand that God’s omnibenevolence means that God 
has full knowledge of what is objectively morally right and wrong, where 
it is presupposed that there is an objective or universal morality. If this 
is the case, then God’s omnibenevolence means that when he provides 
human beings with instruction, it is instruction of what is objectively 
morally right. However, God at times tells humans to do things that are 
considered to be objectively wrong. Hence, the contradiction generally 
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remains. However, if one still maintains a cultural relativism in light of 
what I have just stated above, then as previously noted in my discussion 
of the scope of the moral epistemological argument and of the definition 
of omnibenevolence that presupposes the existence of an  objective 
morality, such a  divine being that has created a  world in which there 
is no objective morality at all falls outside the moral epistemological 
argument’s scope.
Third, theists may take what may be called the ‘moral reading 
approach’. They may argue that an individual may pick and choose what 
moral commands in the religious texts to select based on what is in fact 
moral. Ethical critics of theism, such as Morriston, may also give this reply. 
By having knowledge of what is ethically right and wrong, problematic 
passages of religious texts may be eliminated as being irrelevant, and 
one may hold only on to those passages of moral commands that are 
praiseworthy. In this fashion, one may have an  appropriate reading 
of religious texts that lies in accord with what is in fact morally right. 
This is consistent with many modern day theists also ignoring passages 
in religious texts that have been shown to be scientifically false. Not 
everything in religious texts must be taken to heart. Rather, people 
should ignore the problematic moral passages and focus only on the 
virtuous ones.
The response is that this does not eliminate the contradiction. God 
still decrees immoral commands and laws, so the contradiction still 
persists. It is just that on the moral reading approach, one may ignore 
such promulgations. However, personally ignoring certain of God’s 
dictates does not mean that God did not make such dictates. Since such 
dictates supposedly exist, there is a contradiction. The theist then may 
counter that God did not make such dictates because they were produced 
merely as a cultural by-product, they were made by a false witness, they 
were misinterpretations of God’s word, etc. The only commands he 
really made as captured in religious scripture are ethical ones, and any 
immoral commands are purely fabricated or misinterpretations of God’s 
word. However, most religious texts are taken to be sacred scripture 
directly or indirectly coming from the word of God. The Bible is taken 
to be holy and generally should be treated as such by their followers. 
Second, as a burden of proof response, if certain passages of the Bible 
are fabricated or misinterpretations, then who is to deny that the entire 
Bible is also fabricated or is a misinterpretation? The entire Bible itself 
could very well have been produced as merely a  cultural by-product, 
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as a misinterpretation, as a concoction constructed by false witnesses, 
etc. A theist making the move to say that the problematic passages are 
merely cultural by-products, misinterpretations, that they are produced 
by a  false witness, etc., opens the floodgates for this type of criticism. 
Therefore, in this circumstance, the theist needs to provide a criterion 
that justifiably determines when a passage is really and accurately from 
God or not. The burden of proof squarely falls on the theist for this 
difficult task that somehow is able to show that the immoral commands 
did not really come from God but other ethical commands, many of 
which are stated in the same authored book or chapter as the supposedly 
inaccurate immoral mandates, actually did come from God. I take it that 
this is a significant and difficult burden of proof. To note, the theist may 
respond that since God is omnibenevolent, only the moral commands 
are really from God while the immoral ones must be fabricated or must 
be misinterpretations. This is the criterion for separating legitimate holy 
passages from the illegitimate ones. However, the question at hand is 
whether the supposed omnibenevolent God gave immoral commands 
or not. If one states that the supposed God did not do so because he is 
omnibenevolent, then one has simply begged the question at hand.
A fourth objection is the canonical approach, whose main champion 
is the biblical scholar Brevard Childs (1970, 2006). This view claims that 
eliminating certain passages in the Bible as in the moral reading approach 
while keeping certain others is a distortion of the Biblical witness and 
it demeans the very essence of scripture. Therefore, one must take the 
entire canonical evidence into consideration and understand individual 
passages in a wider context. One must keep in mind the meaning and 
import of the biblical texts as a whole when interpreting them. By looking 
at the integrated big picture and gathering a total contextual impression, 
the purportedly ethically problematic passages of the Bible can be seen 
in a  different light and interpretation than if they were examined in 
isolation. For example, the supposedly ethically problematic acts of the 
Patriarchs in the book of Genesis, when examined based on the canonical 
approach and bringing in the book of Psalms (Psalms 105 & 106), can 
be seen as a lesson of redemption and God’s purposes of salvation rather 
than being seen as an  instance of certain Biblical characters having 
supposedly morally suspect intentions.
The first problem with this approach is that even if there is 
a  systematic moral message in the Bible, an  omnibenevolent God 
under no circumstances should explicitly still order for genocide, rape, 
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revenge killings, misogyny, and the like. There appears to be no excuse 
for uttering such commands from an  entity that is omnibenevolent, 
especially when people actually did perform the relevant heinous acts 
in the specified situations. Systematization of overarching moral themes 
should have been reached through other more palatable means. Second, 
the canonical approach requires the moral tenets of the entire Bible to 
have a  substantial degree of coherence and consistency, but the Bible 
is notoriously anything but that (Davies 2010: 92-97). There is not one 
unified moral vision to the Bible or an  overarching general theme. 
Too many contradictions exist for coherence and systematization. For 
example, numerous instances of apparently immoral commands that 
directly contradict many of the teachings of, for instance, Jesus have 
already been examined above. Given the moral contradictions of peace 
and violence in the Bible, the Christian scholar Eryl Davies notes in 
light of the canonical approach that, ‘Individual traditions are often 
suppressed in the interest of maintaining a  coherent whole, and the 
plurality of perspectives is dissolved in an attempt to achieve a harmony 
where patently no harmony exists’ (2010: 94). For example, notice the 
striking and contradicting passages in the Bible, where the first predicts 
a reign of peace and the second is a demand for war:
They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into 
pruning hooks (Isaiah 2:4).
Beat your ploughshares into swords and your pruning hooks into spears 
(Joel 3:10).
Fifth is the paradigmatic approach, where one of the main proponents 
is the biblical scholar Christopher Wright (2004). This view generally 
claims that the Old Testament provides people with broad general moral 
principles that may help people in their decision-making. Such broad 
rules are to be understood as general models that human beings are to 
apply in the particular moral scenarios people may encounter in their 
everyday moral lives. Therefore, people should not pay attention to the 
specific laws and customs of the Old Testament, but they should focus 
on the general principles that underlie them. As with the canonical 
approach, there is an alternate underlying meaning and interpretation 
to the passages. For example, the law of the Jubilee year (Lev 25:8-55) – 
that forfeited property to a creditor must periodically be restored to the 
debtor – is no longer applied in today’s age. However, from this passage 
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people may garner the underlying principle that they should show 
compassion to the poor.
The response, similar to the canonical approach, is that even if there 
is some kind of underlying benevolent message to the problematic 
passages of the Bible, an omnibenevolent God still should not explicitly 
state orders for pillaging, plundering, and ethnic cleansing. Underlying 
general principles should not be implicitly given by an omnibenevolent 
God by explicitly stating what are appalling moral injunctions, especially 
since people actually did perform the licentious acts in the relevant 
situations. Surely a  truly omnibenevolent God would have used other 
means for moral education. Therefore, the inconsistency remains. For 
instance, it specifically may be asked what the underlying moral principle 
is to a  particular problematic case. Take for instance the command 
for the genocide of the Canaanites. While Wright acknowledges the 
moral revulsion from reading the relevant chapters, he claims that the 
general underlying message is one of salvation and ‘universal blessing’ 
for the people of God. There is an  underlying alternative meaning 
and interpretation to it all. However, what about the blessing of the 
slaughtered Canaanites who were also made in God’s image? Doesn’t 
God love all his children? Also, the supposed underlying principles or 
meanings to many passages still do not justify the explicit commands 
contained in those passages that were acted upon.6 Bringing about the 
purported underlying moral theme of salvation and blessing for God’s 
people and not for others by in part commending genocide and rape 
is severely morally unacceptable and should not have been ordered by 
a supposedly omnibenevolent God. An omnibenevolent God could have 
attained his supposed underlying message through more ethical means. 
Hence, the contradiction remains. It seems that in order to be saved, one 
potential avenue that may be taken is that the paradigmatic approach 
may then revert to the canonical approach. However, the canonical 
approach, as has been previously shown, is itself problematic.
On a more extreme note, philosophers such as Richard Swinburne 
(2011), William Lane Craig (2007), and Copan (2008) contend that things 
like genocide in the Bible are morally justified since this either helped 
the Israelites avoid becoming spiritually corrupted by other polytheistic 
6 Commands for genocide were acted upon, but they may not have been completely 
carried out to fulfilment in all cases. For instance, the ancient Jewish people did kill many 
Canaanites, but they did not kill all of them.
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nations or the other nations deserved punishment for their sinful lives. 
For example, Swinburne writes that ethnic and racial extermination is 
justified in that it is used to ‘preserve the young monotheistic religion of 
Israel from lethal spiritual infection by the polytheism of the Canaanites ... 
’ (2011: 224). Craig says, ‘So whom does God wrong in commanding the 
destruction of the Canaanites? Not the Canaanite adults, for they were 
corrupt and deserving of judgment.’ (2007)
In ethics it is exceptionally difficult to justify genocide and ethnic 
cleaning for any reason. To claim the permissibility of wiping out 
a whole people, women, and children is beyond serious consideration. In 
fact, in philosophy I have only read theist philosophers of religion, who 
supposedly believe in the teachings of Jesus, try to do this. Regarding 
Craig’s claim that the extermination of many races and ethnicities was 
deserved since they committed so many ostensible sins, what were 
taken at the time to be common immoral acts of relevant non-Jewish 
ethnicities were idolatry, incest, adultery, prostitution, child sacrifice, 
homosexuality, and bestiality. The most serious of these is child sacrifice. 
Let us put this to the side for now and discuss the other so-called sins. 
We will return and discuss child sacrifice later.
Killing others because they practice a  different religion, partake 
in incest, prostitution, adultery, homosexuality, and bestiality is not 
justified. Assuming that capital punishment is justified, people have 
an  individual right to life; a  right that cannot be so easily taken away 
via capital punishment except in the most egregious of circumstances 
such as in cases of premeditated murder. However, the so-called sins 
at hand are not even close to being crimes that are worthy of capital 
punishment. The mass genocide is not warranted for the purported 
sins in question. Furthermore, what would Jesus do; a  man who kept 
the company of prostitutes and corrupt tax collectors? Jesus, arguably 
the most influential and most powerful moral philosopher in the history 
of ethics, famously also forgave a criminal who was dying next to him 
on a cross, and while hanging on the cross from nails through his body 
embedded in wood, he said in regard to his Roman persecutors (this is 
truly remarkable), ‘Father, forgive them; for they know not what they 
are doing’ (Luke 23:34). The right thing to do for those sinners, such as 
the Canaanites who probably were not even aware that their acts were 
supposed sins, is to try to change them and teach them the error of their 
ways with great patience (Morriston 2009). It is not to order for them to 
be killed: men, women, infants, animals, and all.
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Concerning child sacrifice, does this justify capital punishment 
in the form of genocide? What is curious in this case is that God also 
commands for child sacrifice for his people: ‘I defiled them through their 
very gifts, in their offering up all their firstborn, in order that I might 
horrify them, so that they might know that I am the Lord.’ (Ezek 20:26) 
However, regardless of this fact, even though child sacrifice warrants 
capital punishment, it only ethically warrants it for those who perform 
the sacrifice. To order that the right to life should be taken away for those 
who do not commit this crime, such as infants, and that they should be 
put to death in a mass genocide is egregiously morally wrong. It leads 
to a  basic mistake in ethics of incorrectly and knowingly placing the 
moral blame and moral punishment on the wrong agents, which leads to 
disastrous, unethical, and horrendous effects.
Recall that Swinburne claims that the orders for genocide are required 
in order to protect the young spiritual minds of the Israelites so that they 
are not morally corrupted. To note, one of Hitler’s main justifications 
for the Holocaust was similarly due to the reason that the Jewish people 
supposedly were immoral, and they were corrupting non-Jewish 
Germans. Imagine a third world country in the modern world that was 
largely polytheistic, but now they have widely adopted Christianity. One 
of their neighbouring countries practices a polytheistic religion which 
allows for things like bestiality, prostitution, child sacrifice, etc. This new 
Christian country then says that they are going to attempt to wipe out 
this other polytheistic nation not because they commit immoral acts, 
but rather, only so they do not themselves become spiritually corrupted 
from their neighbours. Even though it is the case that the polytheistic 
nation should be stopped for performing things like child sacrifice, is the 
moral thing to do in this case to order the killing of all the people of this 
polytheistic nation including the children who themselves would have 
been sacrificed? Is such a commendation of genocide warranted just to 
stop one’s own people from being morally influenced and corrupted? 
This is clearly a  perversion of morality, to order for a  command of 
genocide in this case, especially since you do not need to kill their 
infants in order to stop your own people from being corrupted. Also, it 
makes a fundamental error in ethics of knowingly and falsely attributing 
moral blame on the children, some of whom would have been sacrificed 
themselves. Furthermore, what would Jesus do in this case? Patient 
moral education, love, and tolerance of sinners who may not even know 
the error of their ways so that they might find moral redemption would 
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be the remedy. Jesus would especially find orders for the killing of the 
babies of the polytheistic nation and taking away their right to life to be 
ethically repulsive. For the above reasons and via argument by analogy, 
Swinburne’s justification for the many genocides is also not warranted.7
Finally, theists such as Alvin Plantinga (2011), Michael Bergmann 
(2009), and Mark Murphy (2011) make the appeal to ignorance. This is 
where humans ignorantly perceive apparent problematic moral passages 
in scripture, but such passages are really not problematic. God works 
in mysterious ways, and human beings are ignorant of his ‘big picture’, 
purposes, and final educational aims. One cannot know God’s ultimate 
plan or purpose similar to how a  small child cannot fully understand 
her parents’ intentions, but one must be assured that the ultimate plan 
is such that somehow no logical contradiction exists. Notice that the 
appeal to ignorance for the moral epistemological argument does not 
directly demonstrate that there is no contradiction as all the previously 
entertained theistic objections in this paper attempt to do, but rather 
it functions in a  more indirect fashion. In the case at hand, the theist 
cannot explicitly state why it is not the case that there is a contradiction. 
Rather, God works in mysterious ways, and God’s plan has it set up such 
that it is not the case that there is a contradiction even though we do not 
know why.
However, the fact that God works in mysterious ways does not 
necessarily mean that no contradiction exists. For, in making such 
a  move, the theist does not take into account that it could equally be 
the case that even though the supposed God works in mysterious ways, 
the apparent contradiction still persists. It does not immediately follow 
from the appeal to ignorance that the contradiction has been eliminated. 
The property of ‘working in mysterious ways’ does not in-and-of-itself 
necessarily lead to the fact that the supposed contradiction must then 
be eradicated. Rather, at this first initial stage of assessing the appeal to 
ignorance and the property ‘working in mysterious ways’, it is equally 
rational to conclude that there still may be a supposed contradiction or 
there may not be one, and thus, an agnosticism is warranted regarding 
the efficacy of the appeal to ignorance. It is equally rational that God 
works in mysterious ways always towards good or perhaps, on the other 
hand, sometimes towards evil. If the theist then claims that the supposed 
contradiction must be eradicated if God works in mysterious ways 
7 For further reasons against Swinburne, see (Morriston 2011).
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because the purported God is omnibenevolent, then this is once again 
begging the question. On the other hand, the fact remains that given all 
the concrete religious textual evidence discussed above, there is a rather 
sizable and significant level of justification that the supposed existence of 
an omnibenevolent God does at times lead to an apparent contradiction 
as stated in the moral epistemological argument. There is significant 
evidence that if God exists, at times God purportedly does issue immoral 
decrees. Due to this bevy of direct tangible evidence, this places a heavy 
and substantial burden of proof on the theist who makes the appeal to 
ignorance to show in a non-question begging way that even though God 
works in mysterious ways, the purported God and his existence in all 
the problematic passages eliminates rather than upholds the supposed 
contradiction. While this burden of proof counter as presently stated 
in-and-of-itself may be sufficient to respond to the appeal to ignorance, 
what is even stronger, this burden that the theist bears can never be met 
by the theist who makes the appeal to ignorance precisely because God 
works in mysterious ways, and no one can know or understand his plans; 
an understanding that is required in order to meet the burden.
CONCLUSION
I  have newly articulated an  argument for atheism called, ‘the moral 
epistemological argument’. I have laid out the theoretical basis of how it 
is a logical contradiction contention and how it differs from other logical 
contradiction arguments such as the problem of evil and the problem of 
hell. I have supported it with problematic ethical religious passages, and 
I have defended this argument from potential counters from philosophers 
and religious scholars. Some of the attempts particularly from religious 
scholars have not been addressed generally by philosophers, and 
some of them may not even be known in many philosophical circles. 
Furthermore, at times I have provided novel rebuttals of the various ways 
theists may try to object to the moral epistemological argument. All in 
all, given the moral epistemological argument, I conclude that God does 
not exist.
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